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COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Local-Level Public Goods and Collective Action
NANCY MCCARTHY
In communities throughout the world people work togetherto provide goods and services that their governments do
not provide.They build and maintain local parks, feeder roads,
religious buildings, and community halls; they operate volunteer
fire control groups and establish rules for local natural
resource management. Sometimes local groups share responsi-
bilities for maintaining public services, such as schools and
health clinics, with their local or central governments.
Not all communities, however, provide the optimal level of
local public goods. Evidence shows that not only are some
public goods provided more often than others, but also that
some communities mobilize themselves more easily to provide
them. Given the vital importance of public goods in providing
basic services necessary for alleviating poverty and in managing
the local natural resource base for sustainable development,
this brief offers an approach to understanding the problems
communities face in providing different kinds of public goods.
WHY ARE SOME PUBLIC GOODS “EASIER” TO
PROVIDE THAN OTHERS?
Even within the same community, people cooperate to provide
certain public goods but not others. It is possible to explore
this variability by asking, How do one individual’s benefits
change depending on how many other people actually
contribute to a specific activity?  Using game theory to
examine an individual’s incentives to contribute to a public
good helps to highlight the exact nature of the interdepend-
ency among community members in terms of the decision to
contribute or not.
This brief considers five potential incentive structures that
are likely to be important empirically, although the actual
number of possibilities is much greater. In the first case, every
individual is better off contributing to the public good even if
no others contribute. In this case, the role of the group might
be only to share information and coordinate activities. Such an
incentive structure might occur when there are large
increasing returns to contributions in the provision of a public
good. Certain pest control measures might have this structure;
if each individual controls pests on his or her own farm, overall
pest prevalence may drop to zero, so everyone realizes large
benefits. Unfortunately, such a fortuitous incentive structure
does not occur often.
In the second case, the individual may be better off
contributing to the public good if no one else does, but when
others contribute the individual would prefer to “free ride,” or
contribute nothing.This case is often referred to as a “chicken
game.” As in the first case, the primary role of the group is to
coordinate actions among members. Coordination is particu-
larly important if the good must be repeatedly provided and
members can take turns in providing the good. Herd mobility
is such an example: each herder would prefer to stay at home
and avoid the costs of mobility but would rather move if
others remain at home. Coordinating herd movements can
lead to a socially optimal pattern of herd mobility.
In a third incentive structure, the individual might prefer to
contribute to the public good if all others do but would not if
no one else does—an example of an “assurance game.” In this
case, the role of the group is to assure each member that
others will not free ride. Given the incentive structure, this
case is likely to be more costly to manage than simply coordi-
nating movements as required under a “chicken game”
structure. Investments in community infrastructure sometimes
have this structure, particularly when investments are discrete
decisions, such as construction of a building or bridge.
In the fourth example the individual may prefer not to
contribute if no one else does and also prefer to free ride if
everyone else contributes—even though all members would
be better off if each one contributed his or her own share. In
this case, the incentive structure resembles a “prisoner’s
dilemma.” This situation is likely to occur when returns to
contributions increase but at a decreasing rate: for example,
certain soil erosion control measures. Such an incentive
structure may also result when returns are highly variable, as
they are, for example, for investments in agroforestry tech-
niques in regions with high climatic variability. Managing this
type of incentive structure is likely to be the most costly.
Finally, it may be the case that it would be best, under
existing conditions, not to provide the public good at all. In
other words, social returns to a certain public good may simply
be too low for it to be in the interest of the community
members to provide that good.
Several key factors determining externalities and incentive
structures include technological characteristics (such as the
returns to scale or if the good is discrete), costs of inputs, the
extent to which private goods can substitute for public goods,
and the uncertainty or variability in returns from the public
good.The provision of certain public goods may also affect the
returns to other public goods. For instance, returns to invest-
ments in soil erosion control measures undertaken on
common pastures may depend on collective action in managing
use rates of those pastures. Returns to improving roads and
bridges may be higher where successful pest control leads to
higher marketable crop surpluses.
Finally, actions in one community may affect returns to
activities elsewhere, such that groups operating across commu-
nities may be far more successful than more localized ones.
Pests, fires, and water easily cross community lines and
therefore require many communities to cooperate. Of course,
externalities that affect large segments of the population are
precisely those that give rise to government involvement. Real
and effective partnerships between government agencies and
FOR FOOD, AGRICULTURE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Nancy McCarthy (n.mccarthy@cgiar.org) is a research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
community groups can manage these externalities more
successfully.
WHY ARE SOME COMMUNITIES MORE 
SUCCESSFUL THAN OTHERS IN PROVIDING 
PUBLIC GOODS?
Although the incentive structure determines in part how difficult
it will be to undertake any particular collective activity, there are
also characteristics of the group that determine the cost of
doing so.
Any factors that enhance a group’s ability to identify
common goals, work together, and negotiate in good faith will
enhance cooperative capacity and thus reduce the costs of
undertaking collective action.Trust among members was one of
the first factors to be identified. A history of successful collec-
tive action also improves chances of continuing success in an
expanded set of activities, creating a virtuous circle. Social,
economic, and cultural heterogeneity have long been thought to
reduce cooperative capacity because such diversity makes it
difficult to find mutually beneficial arrangements. Sociocultural
diversity may also improve cooperative capacity, however, by
widening the possible set of cooperative arrangements and
avoiding institutional inertia. Recognition and support from
external agencies, such as government, enhances the authority of
the group to engage in collective action. More participatory
forums for setting the collective action agenda and implementing
activities, transparency and accountability mechanisms, and
credible and fair conflict resolution mechanisms all contribute to
successes in collective action.
Other factors may affect both cooperative capacity and
individual incentives. For instance, increases in group size may
increase individual incentives to free ride. On the other hand,
having more members can initially defray the costs per member.
As membership continues to increase, cooperation becomes
more costly owing to higher negotiation, monitoring, and
enforcement costs. Unequal distribution of wealth and opportu-
nities to work outside of the community also affect cooperative
capacity and incentives.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Where externalities are relatively localized, community
members may be better able to provide public goods because
they are more knowledgeable about local conditions than are
outsiders.As policymakers determine how best to aid communi-
ties in their quest to provide public goods, it is important that
they carefully consider both individual incentives to provide
particular public goods and the factors affecting communities’
capacity to cooperate. For instance, improving a community’s
capacity to cooperate will have spillover benefits for all public
goods provision and so might form part of a national strategy to
improve collective action. In highly heterogeneous communities,
however, a focus on conflict management and resolution mecha-
nisms may be the most useful intervention. Elsewhere, it may be
more relevant to disseminate information on organizational
tools.
Where policymakers are making decisions on devolving
responsibility for specific public goods to the community, they
must undertake a realistic assessment of individual incentives to
engage in collective action. This means assessing the underlying
technological characteristics, gauging the uncertainty, or the vari-
ability, of the benefits to be realized, and determining the extent
to which other public (or even private) goods and services
affect the potential returns from the particular activity. The
costs of making, monitoring, and enforcing agreements vary
according to the underlying incentive structure and are highest
in the “prisoner’s dilemma.” The appropriate organizational
structure, procedural rules for making and enforcing agreements,
and determination of fines or rewards will also differ depending
on the incentive structure, and projects and policies must take
this into account.
Finally, there are certain situations where institutions above
the local level need to operate. Under these conditions, local
groups and local and national government agencies need to
coordinate and cooperate through “co-management,” or nested
arrangements.The burden should not fall on communities alone.
The importance of determining the relative costs and
benefits of promoting community-based collective action before
wide-scale policies and programs are implemented cannot be
overemphasized, particularly in the context of government-led
devolution and decentralization policies.Without a clear under-
standing of costs and benefits, project managers and government
agencies may well impose upon the community the responsibility
for providing a public good or service for which social costs well
outweigh the benefits.Worse still, failure in collective action now
will have a negative impact on the capacity of the community to
engage in successful collective action in the future. 
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